Feature or location? Infants and adults adopt different strategies to search for a hidden toy in an ambiguous task by Oláh, Katalin et al.
Feature or location? Infants and adults adopt different strategies to search for a hidden 1 
toy in an ambiguous task 2 
 3 
Katalin Oláh1,2, Krisztina Kupán1, Andor Csík3, Ildikó Király2, József Topál1 4 
 
5 
1
 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, 6 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2. Magyar Tudósok krt. Budapest, Hungary, H-1117 7 
2
 Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, 46 Izabella u., Budapest, Hungary, H-8 
1064
 
9 
3 
Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, 3-9. 10 
Műegyetem rkp. Hungary, H-1111 Budapest,  11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
ABSTRACT 15 
 16 
Evidence suggests that infants and adults attribute different importance to certain object 17 
properties when performing object-directed actions. Namely, infants tend to rely on 18 
information about an object’s location, whereas adults are more likely to base their actions on 19 
its features. In this study, we tested whether the strategic choices of infants (aged 13 months) 20 
and adults would be modified by the context of the demonstration. Participants watched as an 21 
experimenter hid a ball under one of two different coloured containers, using either a 22 
communicative or a non-communicative manner. Then, the locations of the two containers 23 
were changed out of sight of the participant. During the test, participants were encouraged to 24 
look for the ball under one of the containers. We found that adults were more likely to follow 25 
a feature-based strategy than infants. However, there was no effect of the context of the 26 
demonstration, suggesting that communication may play different roles in encoding object 27 
properties and directing overt behaviour. 28 
 29 
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INTRODUCTION 32 
 33 
Humans live in environments filled with various kinds of objects of different 34 
properties. Object properties that the human cognitive system monitors and encodes range 35 
from colour, texture, and shape to location and function. They can be classified based on 36 
specific distinctions. One of the most common classification systems was created by 37 
Jeannerod (1986), and differentiates extrinsic and intrinsic object properties. Extrinsic 38 
properties become relevant when performing actions with a certain object, while intrinsic 39 
properties are features that define the identity of the object. Similarly, Marno, Devalier and 40 
Csibra (2013) have differentiated between transient and durable object properties. Transient 41 
properties may change in time (such as the location of an object), while durable properties are 42 
permanent and considered the core of the object's identity.  43 
The distinctions between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” (Jeannerod, 1986) or “durable” 44 
and “transient” (Marno et al, 2013) object properties resonate well with the 45 
neurophysiological dissociation found in visual object processing. There are two distinct 46 
neural pathways which contribute to the visual perception of objects: the dorsal route and the 47 
ventral route. While the former processes information relevant to guiding object-directed 48 
actions, such as location, size or motion, the latter plays a crucial role in processing 49 
information necessary for the identification of objects (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson & Carey, 50 
1991; Milner, & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin; 1982).  51 
Under normal circumstances, different properties become integrated into complex 52 
representations of objects, however, in certain cases, the distinct processes and their 53 
ontogenetic trajectories can be manifested. Based on extensive research with infants, 54 
investigators have concluded that location has primacy over surface features when infants 55 
process information about objects (Káldy & Leslie, 2003; Kellman & Spelke, 1983; 56 
Newcombe, Huttenlocher, & Learmonth, 1999; Xu & Carey, 1996). For example, infants use 57 
spatiotemporal information to individuate objects at 10 months of age, but they cannot do the 58 
same based solely on feature information (Xu & Carey, 1996). Since the seminal paper of Xu 59 
and Carey (1996), it has been shown that, under distinct circumstances, even young infants 60 
can take featural properties of objects into account (e.g. Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998). 61 
Nonetheless, the claim that accurate processing of spatiotemporal information precedes that of 62 
surface features remains widely accepted. 63 
Mareschal and Johnson (2003) suggest that although the infant brain is prepared to 64 
process both types of information, it takes longer for an adult-like representation of the object 65 
to be achieved by integrating information processed independently by the ventral and dorsal 66 
pathways described above. Mareschal and Johnson (2003) also found that location 67 
information is not always favoured over feature information, but that a feature-based 68 
representation can be induced by applying stimuli appropriate for the ventral stream. In their 69 
study, 4-month-old infants spent more time looking at scenarios violating expectations of 70 
location when the target stimuli were toy figures (and thus could be manipulated), but 71 
responded to violation of expectations of featural information when they were presented with 72 
human faces or two-dimensional asterisks (Mareschal & Johnson, 2003). Similarly, Kaufman, 73 
Mareschal and Johnson (2003) suggest that the graspability of an object determines which 74 
aspect of the object is more likely to be processed and maintained. Thus, we have reason to 75 
believe that an infant’s tendency to process location and ignore surface features is not due to 76 
the inability to process feature information per se, but rather to the difficulty of integrating the 77 
two types of information, as well as the fact that the characteristics of the target objects used 78 
in most studies induce an action-relevant attitude.  79 
A study by Haun, Call, Janzen and Levinson (2006) took a different approach to the 80 
problem: it investigated spatial memory and strategy-making in an object-locating paradigm 81 
with 1- and 3-year-old humans and apes. During the demonstration, a reward (a piece of food 82 
or a toy object) was hidden under one of three containers, each with a distinctive shape and 83 
colour. Then, two of the containers were switched out of the subject’s sight in a way that the 84 
reward either moved with the container or remained in its original place. In the test phase, 85 
participants had to choose between the containers and were rewarded if they were correct. The 86 
task was particularly puzzling because participants only had access to ambiguous information 87 
about the location of the reward, which could either move with the container or stay at its 88 
original location. Importantly, therefore, a successful search strategy cannot be objectively 89 
defined. In this ambiguous object-search task, 3 year-olds showed a clearly different search 90 
strategy as compared to preverbal infants and adult apes. Namely, one-year-olds and apes 91 
tended to use a location-based strategy, as they found the reward more often when it was left 92 
in its original location, whereas 3-year-olds preferred to rely on a feature-based strategy and 93 
performed better if the reward moved with the container. This study suggests a shift from 94 
devoting more attention to an object’s location (transient property) to focusing on its features 95 
(durable properties) between the ages of 1 and 3.  96 
However, this shift may not only be achieved due to maturation. The Natural 97 
Pedagogy theory put forth by Csibra and Gergely (2006; 2009) claims that communicating 98 
knowledge about different objects or artefacts highlights their durable properties. According 99 
to the theory, ostensive-referential signals induce a genericity bias, which leads the audience 100 
of the communication to assume that the presented knowledge is not only valid in the given 101 
context but can successfully be applied to various situations. Thus, the information is likely to 102 
refer to a kind, rather than just a particular object. This has been confirmed in a study where 103 
9-month old infants were shown to retain information about the location of an object in a non-104 
communicative situation; however, memory was better for the identity of the object in a 105 
communicative context (Yoon, Johnson & Csibra, 2008).  106 
Marno, Davelaar and Csibra (2013) investigated the effect of a communicative context 107 
on object-related memory in adults. Similar to previous findings, they demonstrated that 108 
communicative presentation of the stimuli improved memory for object identity at the 109 
expense of encoding information about its location. Interestingly, adults’ performance was 110 
somewhat better for location when no cues were presented. 111 
Based on the aforementioned findings, we aimed to directly compare the effects of 112 
communication on children and adults’ object-directed behaviour in this study. The theory of 113 
natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) proposes that ostensive-referential cues direct 114 
children’s attention to the durable properties of objects and evoke an expectation in the 115 
recipient that they will be presented with generic information. This hypothesis has already 116 
been confirmed in studies with infants and adults (e.g. Yoon et al., 2008; Marno et al., 2013). 117 
Here, we applied a paradigm similar to the one that Haun et al. (2006) developed to 118 
investigate participants’ strategizing in an object hiding and finding task. In order to gain a 119 
better understanding of participants’ behaviour, we manipulated the context of the 120 
demonstration so that half of the participants saw a highly communicative hiding action while 121 
the other half witnessed a non-communicative demonstration. Haun et al. (2006)’s results 122 
suggest that neither the 1-year-old, nor the 3-year-old participants, had a perfect 123 
understanding of the ambiguous nature of the task since a full appreciation of the 124 
characteristics of the situation – that the reward could either move with the container or not – 125 
would lead participants to choose randomly. Therefore, we included a sample of adult 126 
participants in our study to test whether preference for a feature based strategy was 127 
characteristic of a mature cognitive system that potentially serves evolutionary adaptive 128 
functions (see Haun et al., 2006) or reflects a bias that stems from an imperfect 129 
comprehension of the situation. In the former case, adults would choose based on featural 130 
information, whereas in the latter case, they would not opt for any specific strategy. It is also 131 
plausible to assume that their behaviour will not be moderated by the presence of ostensive-132 
communicative cues as previous results suggest that such signals most likely affect the level 133 
of encoding (e.g. Yoon et al., 2008, Marno et al., 2014). In the case of adults, we have no 134 
reason to assume that encoding different aspects of the demonstration would pose any serious 135 
demands on their cognitive system. Therefore, the presence of communicative cues may not 136 
modify their behaviour.  137 
However, infants’ choices may be more easily influenced by the attention-grabbing 138 
properties of the hiding event (i.e. presence or absence of communicative cues) as infants, 139 
most likely, have difficulty in simultaneous encoding of different aspects of the situation. 140 
Moreover, since the task involves invisible displacement, infants have to be able to keep track 141 
of the different objects even when they cannot see them for a while. Evidence suggests that it 142 
is not until the age of 12 months that infants start to bind featural information to 143 
spatiotemporal information (Xu & Carey, 1996). Hence, at the end of the first year of life, 144 
infants’ representations of objects may still be fragile. In this case, ostensive cues could signal 145 
to children how to allocate their attention and which aspects of the demonstration would be 146 
significant. We therefore hypothesized that, in a non-communicative context, infants would 147 
choose based on the last seen location of the reward, but that this would shift toward a 148 
feature-based search strategy in the communicative situation. 149 
 150 
2. METHOD 151 
 152 
2.1 Participants 153 
Children: Thirty-four 13.5-month-old (mean age: 13.71 months; range: 11.86-14.53 154 
months) infants participated in the study. In addition, nine infants were tested, but later 155 
excluded from the final sample due to passivity (N=6), inappropriate demonstration (N=2) or 156 
because the parent did not cooperate with the instructions (N=1).  157 
 Adults: Forty adults (mean age: 24 years; range: 19.6-36 years) also participated in the 158 
experiment. One additional adult was tested, but later excluded from the final sample due to 159 
inappropriate demonstration. 160 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions 161 
(ostensive-communicative or non-communicative – see below) so that the distribution of age 162 
and gender did not differ across conditions in each age group (Table 1.). Adult participants 163 
and the parents of all infants gave informed consent. Ethical approval was obtained from the 164 
National Psychological Research Ethics Committee (Ref. No. 2011/13). 165 
 166 
Table 1. The distribution of subjects in the conditions and age-groups. 167 
 168 
 
13-month old infants 
(males/females) 
Adults 
(males/females) 
Ostensive-Communicative 
demonstration 
10/6 5/15 
Non-communicative demonstration 9/9 5/15 
Total 19/15 10/30 
 169 
 170 
2.2 Setup and Materials 171 
 172 
Infants were tested in the laboratory (4 x 4 m) of the Institute of Cognitive 173 
Neuroscience and Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, whilst adults were tested in a 174 
room (5 m x 2.5 m) of the Department of Ethology, Loránd Eötvös University. The same 175 
experimental setup was used at both locations. The setup was placed in one corner of the 176 
experimental room and was hidden by a curtain in order to prevent subjects from seeing it 177 
upon entering.  178 
The apparatus consisted of two bell-shaped opaque plastic containers (10 cm high with 179 
an 8 cm radius) placed about 60 cm apart from each other, turned upside down. The two 180 
containers differed in colour (white and brown), but were otherwise identical. A tennis ball 181 
was used as a target object (reward) for all subject groups, which was placed on the ground 182 
between the containers at the beginning of the demonstration phase (Figure 1). 183 
Figure 1. Experimental arrangement 184 
 
1 m 
 185 
 186 
 187 
2.3 Procedure 188 
 189 
When testing infants, the parents were asked to sit on a blanket on the floor placed at a 190 
distance of 3 meters from the apparatus, facing it, and hold their infants on their laps. Adults 191 
were seated on a pre-positioned chair, the same distance from the apparatus as stated for 192 
infants. The procedure consisted of a demonstration phase followed by a test phase. The type 193 
of demonstration depended on experimental condition (Ostensive-communicative vs. Non-194 
communicative), while the test phase was identical for every participant. The tests with 195 
infants were carried out by a female experimenter (K.K.), while those for adults were 196 
performed by a male experimenter (A.CS). 197 
 198 
2.3.1 Demonstration phase: 199 
Ostensive-communicative (OC) condition: After seating the participant, the 200 
experimenter went behind the closed curtains, stood behind the two containers (in the middle), 201 
and then pulled the curtains open. She/he started the demonstration by making eye-contact 202 
with the subject and then touched the top of both containers simultaneously (in order to avoid 203 
local enhancement). After this, the experimenter called the subject’s attention by calling their 204 
name and saying: “Look! I will show you something interesting!” She/he then dropped the 205 
tennis ball onto the ground two times. Then the experimenter called the subject’s attention 206 
again by making eye contact and saying “Look!” and put the tennis ball under one of the 207 
containers. After this, she/he pulled the curtains back closed. Behind the curtains, the 208 
experimenter took the ball from under the container, then pulled the curtain open again and 209 
repeated the whole procedure two more times. In all three cases, she/he placed the ball under 210 
the same container. 211 
Non-communicative (NC) condition: The demonstration in this condition was identical 212 
to the one in the OC condition, except that communication was entirely eliminated. Thus, the 213 
experimenter made no eye contact with the subject, but rather turned her/his face towards the 214 
ground for the duration of the demonstration. Furthermore, she/he did not talk to the subjects, 215 
but mumbled a short unmeaning poem in the same part of the demonstration where verbal 216 
communication was used in the OC condition. This was necessary in order to control for the 217 
possibility that subjects are simply more attentive in the presence of verbal cues. Except for 218 
these changes, the demonstration procedures mimicked those in the OC condition.  219 
The colour and the position (left/right) of the target container were counterbalanced across 220 
conditions. 221 
 222 
2.3.2. Test phase: 223 
The demonstration phase was immediately followed by the test phase. The 224 
experimenter changed the location of the two containers (and thus the location of the target 225 
object as well) while the curtains were closed and then opened them. She/he then left the 226 
apparatus and stood to the side, while saying: “It’s your turn now! Where is the ball?” For the 227 
infant participants, parents were allowed to encourage their child to go and look for the ball, 228 
but they were not allowed to point at the containers or to focus the infant’s attention to a 229 
particular spot in any way. If adult subjects made inquiries about the purpose of the task or 230 
asked what they were supposed to do, the experimenter repeated the instructions but said 231 
nothing more. All subjects had 90 seconds for free exploration. 232 
After the test phase, adult participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire in which 233 
they were explicitly asked what they thought the purpose of the task was. Participants could 234 
choose between the following four possible answers: (a) to find the ball (b) to copy the 235 
demonstrator’s behaviour (c) something else (d) I don’t know. 236 
 237 
2.4 Coding and data analyses 238 
 239 
For the analyses, we coded subjects’ first choices between the two containers. A type 240 
of behaviour was regarded as a choice if the subject touched either of the containers. 241 
However, in one case, where the child proved to be too shy to approach the setup and make 242 
physical contact with the containers, we accepted a clear pointing gesture towards a container 243 
as a choice (infant group: n=1). Furthermore, to test whether subjects were motivated and 244 
regarded finding the tennis ball as the aim of the task, we coded whether subjects obtained the 245 
tennis ball and whether the retrieval terminated the manipulation of the containers.  246 
In order to assess inter-observer agreement with respect to infants and adults’ choice 247 
behaviour, a second person, who was blind to experimental conditions, scored a sample from 248 
each age group (infants: 76%; adults: 100%). Cohen’s Kappa values showed a high level of 249 
reliability in all subject groups (infants: Kappa = 0.946; adults: Kappa = 1) (Landis & Koch, 250 
1977). 251 
 252 
 253 
 254 
3. RESULTS 255 
 256 
The proportion of subjects selecting the empty or the baited container was analyzed by 257 
Generalized Linear Model (SPSS 17) and Binomial tests for binary data. GLM was used to 258 
test the effects of age group (adult vs. infant), Condition (Ostensive-communicative vs. Non-259 
communicative), and Sex (male vs. female) on subjects’ object-search strategy (location-260 
based vs. feature-based). 261 
Age group had a significant main effect on the strategy the participants chose to search 262 
for the ball (χ2(1)=4.29; p=0.038), showing that infants were more likely to employ a location-263 
based strategy (21 out of 34 participants) than adults (15 out of 40) (Figure 2). However, 264 
using binomial tests, we found no clear preference for strategy either in case of adults 265 
(p=0.154) or infants (p=0.175). Moreover, the GLM analysis yielded no main effects of 266 
Condition (χ2(1)=0.854; p=0.355) or Sex (χ
2
(1) =0.7; p=0.448) and we could not find any 267 
significant interactions between Condition, Age group and Sex ( p>0.1 in each case). 268 
Figure 2. Proportion of subjects employing a location based strategy. 269 
Proportion (%) of infants and adult human subjects employing a location-based object search 270 
strategy in the Communicative (Com) and the Non-communicative (Non-Com) conditions.  271 
   272 
 273 
 274 
Furthermore, to test whether infants understood that the purpose of the task was to find 275 
the ball and whether they were motivated to look for it, we also analysed whether infants 276 
continued searching until they managed to retrieve the ball and whether locating the ball 277 
terminated the manipulation of the containers. We found that the great majority of infants 278 
(88.2%) managed to obtain the tennis ball and even those who were unsuccessful (N=4, all in 279 
NC condition) exhibited some interest in the setup by pointing to one of the containers or by 280 
touching one without lifting it. More importantly, success in retrieving the ball ended the 281 
manipulation of the containers in all cases. 282 
To ensure that adults also regarded obtaining the tennis ball as the purpose of the 283 
study, we coded the same categories as we did for the infants. All but two adults continued 284 
searching after checking the empty container, and all of them stopped manipulating the 285 
containers after they managed to retrieve the ball. One subject went on to manipulate the 286 
empty container after a correct choice of the baited one but then did not notice the ball rolling 287 
feature-based 
search strategy  
location-based 
search strategy 
out from under the container. Furthermore, while analysing the answers to the questionnaire, 288 
we found that the majority (N=33) of adults chose “to find the ball” as an answer to the 289 
question, while four of them answered that the purpose was to copy the demonstrator’s 290 
behaviour and three of them thought that it was something else (they assumed there was some 291 
trick in the task).  292 
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that in the choice behaviour of the subjects, we 293 
found a marginal preference for the brown container by the infants (p=0.089), and no 294 
container preference by the adults (p=0.268). We found no side preference either in case of 295 
adults (p=0.875) or infants (p=0.5) (binomial tests, test proportion: 0.5). 296 
 297 
 298 
4. DISCUSSION 299 
 300 
In this study, we tested whether infants and adults focus on different properties of an 301 
object in a toy-hiding paradigm depending on the context of the hiding event (ostensive-302 
communicative vs. non-communicative). While most studies that explore the effects of the 303 
demonstration usually target the level of encoding, we investigated how it affects behaviour 304 
regulation in an ambiguous situation. Our study aimed at extending the results of Haun et al. 305 
(2006) and exploring how different biases in object-directed behaviour develop. We 306 
hypothesized that the behaviour of adults and infants would be influenced by potentially 307 
different processes. We expected adults to either choose based on the features of the objects 308 
or show a random search strategy. We also proposed that an infant’s searching behaviour 309 
would be modulated by biasing the encoding of the scenario in the demonstration phase. 310 
We have found partial support for our hypotheses. First, our results show that infants 311 
and adults indeed adopt different strategies when confronted with an ambiguous hiding event. 312 
Namely adults – as compared to infants – tended to rely more on feature information and 313 
followed the switch event in order to find the ball. These results correspond to Haun et al. 314 
(2006), who showed a developmental shift in search strategy between the ages of one and 315 
three. However, a closer examination of the results shows that this shift does not mean that 316 
adults develop a clear preference for a feature-based strategy. In their case, appreciating the 317 
ambiguity of the task could have resulted in a conscious choice of random searching strategy 318 
irrespective of the context of the demonstration. Infants, on the other hand, may have had 319 
more difficulty in memorizing every aspect of the situation and possibly could not fully 320 
understand the ambiguity they were faced with. Their choice, therefore, could have merely 321 
reflected a tendency to orient toward the last seen location rather than a conscious choice to 322 
randomly select a container. 323 
Contrary to our expectations, the context of the hiding event did not matter either for 324 
adults or infants. When faced with an ambiguous situation, participants did not adjust their 325 
behaviour according to the context of the demonstration, showing that communicative cues 326 
did not prompt focus on the featural properties of the object in question, even in the case of 327 
infants. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that communication did not affect participants’ 328 
information processing at all. 329 
Our experiment was designed in a way that participants were ‘forced’ to rely either on 330 
location or on feature information to search for the ball. Therefore, responses did not only 331 
reflect how the context of the demonstration affected encoding. As a consequence, the present 332 
study cannot fully disentangle the levels of encoding and behaviour execution. Participants’ 333 
performance may have remained unaffected by the context either because the demonstration 334 
failed to elicit differential encoding of information or because participants did not take the 335 
communicative nature of the demonstration into account when planning their behaviour. 336 
Previous results have repeatedly shown that a communicative context qualitatively changes 337 
the encoding of a scenario even in case of infants. For example, Yoon et al (2008) have 338 
demonstrated a memory bias in learning about the features or the location of an object; 339 
whereas Futó, Téglás, Csibra & Gergely (2010) have shown that presenting object functions 340 
in a communicative manner induce kind-based learning. Considering these findings, we 341 
propose that our results can be best explained by the inability to inhibit a prepotent answer to 342 
orient toward the last seen location of the object rather than by “immunity” to ostensive cues. 343 
Note that most of the studies that have proven the existence of the genericity bias in infants 344 
(e.g. Yoon et al., 2008) have used looking-time paradigms.  345 
However, the interpretation described above is still plausible considering the results of 346 
Topál, Gergely, Miklósi, Erdőhegyi & Csibra (2008) with the A-not-B error. Their study has 347 
shown that although a non-communicative demonstration reduces infants’ tendency to 348 
repeatedly (and erroneously) search for a toy in its original hiding location, it is not fully 349 
eliminated by changing the context. Since in the Topál et al. study the containers had no 350 
distinctive features, infants may have used location as the basis of generalization (e.g. “the toy 351 
belongs in container A”). Note, however, that our study involved two containers with 352 
different featural properties, which could have considerably increased the complexity and 353 
difficulty of the task for infants. It is also worth mentioning that the standard A-not-B task 354 
used in the above-mentioned study does not involve occlusion; the change of location happens 355 
in full view of the infant, whereas in our study, participants did not see the relocation of the 356 
object. Therefore, participants could have been more easily confused, leading to a lack of 357 
context effect. 358 
Finally, comparing our results with that of Haun et al. (2006) could shed some light on 359 
the processes that influence the behaviour of different participant groups. Haun et al. have 360 
shown that 1-year-old children choose based on the location of the container, which is 361 
consistent with our own results. They have also found that – in contrast – 3-year-old children 362 
prefer a feature-based strategy. While the procedures for our study differed from that of Haun 363 
et al. (e.g. only one trial per participant; but with three repetitions of the demonstration; using 364 
two containers instead of three, with different colours but identical shapes), the most notable 365 
difference between the two paradigms concerns the context of the demonstration. While we 366 
systematically manipulated whether the demonstration was accompanied by communication 367 
or not, Haun et al. (2006) conducted their experiments in the standard fashion: communicating 368 
with the children in order to increase the involvement of the participants. Therefore, their 369 
findings can be best compared with our results in the Ostensive-Communicative condition, 370 
confirming our claim that despite infants’ sensitivity to ostensive-communicative cues, the 371 
effect of communication is not exhibited in active paradigms due to the immaturity of other 372 
processes (such as inhibition). We propose that 3-year-old children chose a feature-based 373 
strategy in Haun et al.’s study because their cognitive processes were mature enough for 374 
communication to effectively influence not only their encoding of the situation but – through 375 
that – their execution of behaviour as well. Our results with adults complement the 376 
interpretation by showing that such biases are fully eliminated when a perfect appreciation of 377 
the ambiguity of the task is acquired. 378 
 379 
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